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CHAPTER 19 
State and Municipal Government 
JOSEPH C. DUGGAN 
A. M UNICIP AL GOVERNMENT 
§19.1. Zoning by-laws: Determination of validity. A petition was 
filed in the Land Court 1 to determine the validity of an amendment to 
a town zoning by-law in the case of Pierce v. Town ot Wellesley.2 The 
amendment, adopted at a special town meeting, revised a section of the 
town zoning by-law so as to include the words "municipally owned or 
operated public parking lot" among the purposes for which "single 
residence districts premises" may be used. The petitioners requested 
rulings of law to the effect that the amendment, which reserved to the 
town the privilege of operating parking lots in residence areas, was in-
valid, (a) because arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory, and (b) 
because bearing no substantial relation to the promotion of public 
health, welfare, safety, etc. The requested rulings were not granted. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, hearing the case on a bill of exceptions, 
held that the amendment of the zoning by-law was valid, reiterating 
the much stated principle that "every presumption is to be made in 
favor of" the amendment, and observed that "the fact that the question 
is debatable does not empower the court to substitute its judgments" 3 
for that of the town. The Court further ruled that the town meeting 
was not arbitrary and unreasonable in revising its zoning by-law so as 
to permit town parking lots even in residence zones. Whether the pub-
lic necessity for traffic relief extended to residence zones, as well as to 
other parts of the town, was a matter for legislative determination by 
the town meeting, the members of which could exercise their collective 
judgment in the light of their special knowledge of conditions in the 
JOSEPH C. DUGGAN recently resigned as City Solicitor for the City of New Bedford, 
Massachusetts to accept appointment as Assistant Attorney General of the Common-
wealth in charge of the Criminal Division. He is a member of the Massachusetts 
and Federal Bars. 
The author gratefully acknowledges research assistance rendered by Ayres A. Se-
queira, a member of the New Bedford and Bristol County Bar Associations and 
member of the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Acushnet, Massachusetts. 
§19.l. 1 G.L., c. 240, §14A; c. 185, §1(jY2). 
2336 Mass. 517, 146 N.E.2d 666 (1957). For further comment on this case, see 
§14.2 supra. 
3 See Cohen v. Lynn, 333 Mass. 699, 705, 132 N .E.2d 664, 668 (1956), and cases 
there cited. 
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town; 4 and the fact that parking lots in residential areas would be 
detrimental to some adjacent properties does not invalidate a town 
policy of permitting these parking lots for good and valid public 
reasons by a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory zoning by-law. 
The Court, however, in the case of Atherton v. Selectmen of Bourne/' 
arrived at a decision different from that in the Pierce case. It was de-
cided that an amendment to the zoning by-law attempting to reclassify 
certain land in the town of Bourne was invalid when it endeavored to 
single out a small tract of land for different treatment from that ac-
corded to similar surrounding land indistinguishable from it in charac-
ter, and therefore was, in effect, "spot zoning." 6 The Court, turning 
to the procedural aspects of the case, posed the question whether the 
proper remedy of the persons aggrieved was by appeal to the board of 
appeals under G.L., c. 40A, §13, or by petition for a writ of mandamus. 
It was decided that a petition for a writ of mandamus would lie, al-
though mandamus, being an extraordinary legal remedy, ordinarily 
would not be appropriate if another and effectual remedy were avail-
able.'/' The Court noted, however, that the statutory remedy afforded 
by G.L., c. 40A, §13 was not available to petitioners under the particu-
lar facts of this case. 
§I9.2. Tort: Basis for municipalliabiIity for acts of independent 
contractor. Whether a town is liable for damages arising out of the 
alleged negligent act of an independent contractor was the issue raised 
in the case of Thurlow v. Town of Provincetown.1 Although a munici-
pality is liable for its negligence in connection with maintain,ing a 
water supply system in part for the use of inhabitants who pay for the 
water supplied,2 nevertheless, to affix liability, it must be shown either 
that the servants or employees of the town participating in the work 
were negligent 8 or, as in this case, reference must be made to some 
theory, other than agency, under which a town would be held liable for 
the negligent acts of an independent contractor. The McConnon case4 
had earlier expounded a theory applicable to instances in which the 
work done was of an especially dangerous character, hazardous to the 
4 Burham v. Board of Appeals of Gloucester. 333 Mass. 114. 117. 128 N.E.2d 772. 
774 (1955); see also Concord v. Attorney General. 336 Mass. 17.24. 142 N.E.2d 360. 
365. 
111958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 511. 149 N.E.2d 232. For further comment on this case. see 
§§14.2 and 14.5 supra. 
6 General Laws. c. 40A. §2 provides: "Due regard shall be paid to the characteris-
tics of the different parts of the city or town. and the zoning regulations in any city 
or town shall be the same for zones. districts or streets having substantially the 
same character." 
'/'See Parrotta v. Hederson. 315 Mass. 416,420.53 N.E.2d 97.99 (1944). 
§19.2. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 727. 149 N.E.2d 901. 
2 Iver Johnson Sporting Goods Co. v. Boston. 334 Mass. 401.402. 135 N.E.2d 658. 
659 (1956); Sloper v. Quincy. 301 Mass. 20. 24.16 N.E.2d 14. 17 (1938). 
3 See Baumgardner v. Boston. 304 Mass. 100. 105-107.23 N.E.2d 121. 124-125 (1939). 
4 McConnon v. Charles H. Hodgate Co.. 282 Mass. 584. 588. 185 N .E. 483. 485 
(1933). 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1958 [2012], Art. 23
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1958/iss1/23
§19.3 STATE AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 205 
extent that "necessarily from the nature and circumstances of the work 
harm will occur unless guarded against," so that even if a municipality 
was not negligent in the selection of the independent contractor, it 
nevertheless would still be liable "if, through any lack of reasonable 
care on its own part in guarding against the known dangers of the un-
dertaking, injury resulted from the negligence of those to whom it en-
trusted its performance." The Supreme Judicial Court, in the Thur-
low case, having found that the defendant town had no ground to be-
lieve that injury would probably result from this work unless it took 
special precaution, held that there was no basis to hold the town liable 
for any negligence on the part of the independent contractor. Profes-
sor Prosser states that 
the principle [of responsibility for negligence of an independent 
contractor doing inherently dangerous work] seems to be limited 
to work in which there is a high degree of risk in relation to the 
particular surrounding, or some rather specific danger to those in 
the vicinity recognizable in advance as calling for definite pre-
cautions.5 
§19.3. Schools: School committee power over teachers' salaries and 
finance. The traditional supremacy of the school committee relative 
to the right to fix the salaries of public school teachers was impugned 
in the case of Lynch v. City of Fall River.1 In the year 1956, the school 
committee presented the mayor with budget estimates which, in turn, 
were incorporated in the budget that was submitted to and approved 
by the city council for that year. In June, 1956, because of vacancies 
which had not been filled, there was a large unexpended balance in the 
teachers' salaries allocation. The school committee voted to allot the 
unexpended balance to an increase in the salaries of teachers for that 
year. Although the city did not controvert the absolute right of the 
school committee to fix the salaries of public school teachers,2 it did 
contend that this right must be exercised prior to the adoption of the 
annual budget. Reliance was placed upon G.L., c. 44, §33A which 
reads in part, "The annual budget shall include sums sufficient to pay 
the salaries of officers and employees fixed by law or by ordinance." 
The short answer given to the city's contention was that school teach-
ers' salaries are fixed not "by law or by ordinance" but by contract.3 
The Court resolved the issue in this case by citing the controlling case 
of Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield,4 wherein an attempt to 
increase salaries, after the budget became effective, was also made. In 
deciding the question in the Leonard case, Chief Justice Rugg in effect 
stated that, when a school committee does not attempt to spend more 
than a total appropriation made for the support of the public schools 
5 Prosser, Torts §64 at pp. 357·361 (2d ed. 1956). 
§19.3. 1336 Mass. 558,147 N.E.2d 152 (1958). 
2 See Watt v. Chelmsford, 323 Mass. 697, 700, 84 N.E.2d 28, 29 (1949). 
3 G.L., c. 71, §38. 
4241 Mass. 325, 135 N.E. 459 (1922). 
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but merely asserts a right to fix salaries of teachers without being re-
stricted in this regard to particular items specified in the budget, the 
statutes have all been interpreted to confer upon school committees 
power so to establish the salaries of teachers within the total amounts 
appropriated by the budget. 
A deficiency in the town's total appropriation for school purposes 
at the March, 1956 annual meeting, below the amount requested by the 
school committee, was the subject of a petition under G.L., c. 71, §34 5 
by ten taxable inhabitants of the town of Plymouth in the case of Illig 
v. Town of Plymouth.6 The town contended that the salary estimates 
of the school committee, having been submitted forty-one days after 
the time provided by statute, and unreasonably near to the date of the 
town meeting, may not be made a basis for requiring that the town 
vote for the requested school items. The town based its contention on 
G.L., c. 41, §59 which provides: 
... committees ... of a town authorized by law to expend 
money shall furnish to the town accountant . . . not less than ten 
days before the end of the town financial year, detailed estimates 
of the amounts necessary for the proper maintenance of the de-
partments under their jurisdiction for the ensuing year ... 
It having been previously held in the case of Hayes v. Brockton,7 that 
in respect to cities, the school committee acting within the scope of its 
powers and duties under G.L., c. 71 was not controlled by a provision 
similar to that above quoted,8 the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the 
contention of the town. 
The case of Young v. Worcesterl' went one step further in respect to 
city budgets, for it was there set forth that a school committee, to in-
sist upon an appropriation, must necessarily give its estimates to the 
executive at least before the time of his submission of budget to the 
council. But it should be noted, in contrast, that the provisions ap-
plicable to estimates and budgets of cities are neither applicable to nor 
comparable to those of towns. Therefore, the Court, in the Illig de-
cision, felt that the principles established in the Young case, which 
applied only to cities, did not obligate the school committee of a town 
to give its estimates to the finance committee before the town meeting 
as a condition of recovery under G.L., c. 71, §34. The distinction seems 
to be that a city budget has aspects of a legislative instrument whereas 
5 "Every city and town shall annually provide an amount of money sufficient for 
the support of the public schools as required by this chapter. Upon petition to the 
superior court •... brought by ten or more taxable inhabitants thereof •... al-
leging that the amount necessary in such city or town for the support of public 
schools as aforesaid has not been included in the annual budget appropriations for 
said year. said court may determine the amount of the deficiency. if any. and may 
order ... such town to provide a sum of money equal to such deficiency ... " 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 497.149 N.E.2d 140. 
7313 Mass. 641. 649. 48 N.E.2d 683. 688 (1943). 
8 C.L.. c. 44. §31A. 
9333 Mass. 724. 133 N.E.2d 211 (1956). 
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by contrast the town budget is, in effect, only compiled recommenda-
tions having no legislative force, the first act with such force in towns 
being a vote at town meeting. The Court also stated that the voters 
may not use a failure of the school committee to conform to the orderly 
procedures leading up to appropriations at town meeting as an excuse 
for not making the school appropriations which C.L., c. 71, §34 says 
they must provide. 
§19.4. Charitable trusts: Ten taxpayers' suit. In the case of Clark 
v. Mayor of Gloucester1 a petition by ten taxable inhabitants was 
brought under C.L., c. 40, §53 to compel the City of Gloucester to 
resort to the Probate Court for application of the cy pres doctrine rela-
tive to certain land which was devised to it as a charitable trust, and 
which the city proposed to sell because the original purpose of the 
settlor could no longer be carried out. Since the act complained of was 
that the city was selling land held as a charitable trust and not that 
the city was about to expend any money or incur any obligation, the 
ten taxable inhabitants statute2 was not applicable. During the pend-
ency of the appeal in this matter, the land was sold; therefore, the dis-
position of the funds resulting from the sale could be determined upon 
a ten taxpayers' petition filed "by leave of court" under C.L., c. 214, 
§3(11). 
§19.5. Wage and salary classification plans: Interpretation of 
method of amendment. In the case of Robinson v. Selectmen of 
Watertown,! amendments to the town's wage and salary plan, estab-
lished under C.L., c. 41, §108A,2 whereby certain town employees were 
to be compensated at higher rates of pay, were submitted to the voters 
at large by invocation of the referendum procedure. The voters at 
large, having voted against the amendment, the proposals for increase 
were thereafter newly initiated and the amendments to the proposed 
compensation and classification plan were voted upon and passed by 
the town meeting members at a subsequent limited town meeting. At 
the trial, wherein the validity of the vote of the limited town meeting 
was questioned, it was argued that the subject matter contained in the 
amendatory articles, relating to salaries and wages, was not a proper 
subject for determination by the voters at large at a referendum town 
meeting, but that the articles were the proper subject for action by the 
limited town meeting. The Supreme Judicial Court resolved this issue 
by turning to the statutory provisions3 under which wage and salary 
§19.4. 1336 Mass. 631,147 N.E.2d 191 (1958) .. 
2 G.L., c. 40, §53. 
§19.5. 1336 Mass. 537, 146 N.E.2d 657 (1957). 
2 The statute reads in part: " ... a town by by·law may establish, and from time 
to time amend, a plan classifying any or all positions, other than those filled by 
popular election and those under the direction and control of the school committee, 
into groups and classes . . . Such ... town may in like manner . . . by vote of 
the town at a town meeting, establish, and from time to time amend, a plan es-
tablishing minimum and maximum salaries to be paid to employees in positions 
so classified ... " 
3 G.L., c. 41, §108A, quoted supra note 2. 
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classification plans are established, and noted that the manner pre-
scribed for amending salaries fixed under said plans was "by vote of the 
town at a town meeting." Looking at the entire context, it is manifest 
that G.L., c. 41, §108A, in prescribing action "by vote of the town at 
a town meeting," contemplated voting by the voters at large at a refer-
endum town meeting and, therefore, the votes of the limited town 
meeting relative to the amendments were invalid. 
§19.6. Public welfare: Settlement. The city, in the case of City of 
Worcester v. Town of Charlton,! had furnished hospital care at its 
municipal institution to a patient who was a resident of, and had a 
settlement in, the defendant town. A question thereafter arose as to 
the rates to be charged by the plaintiff city to the defendant town for 
services and materials. It was contended by the defendant town that it 
was not liable for any charges in excess of those prescribed by G.L., 
c. 117, §24.2 The Supreme Judicial Court resolved the issue by dis-
tinguishing Section 14 of Chapter 117 of the General Laws,S under 
which plaintiff city based its case, from Section 24 of the same chapter, 
cited by the defendant in its argument. Section 14, it was ruled, is 
confined to the class of actions in which a town that has furnished sup-
port is seeking recovery against another town in which the person sup-
ported had a settlement, whereas Section 24 provides an action for 
relief furnished by a private institution or individual, which action 
must be brought against the town in which relief was accorded al-
though it might not be the place of settlement. A case illustrative of 
this point is Symmes Arlington Hospital, Inc. v. Arlington,4 in which 
a private institution was allowed to recover from the town in which the 
hospital was located under Section 24 for care and services rendered to 
patients who were residents of another town. The scope of Section 24 
is to make a town, in which the necessary relief was furnished by an 
individual or private institution, immediately liable, with a right in 
that town to recover from the indigent person himself under Section 5, 
or from the town ultimately liable (place of settlement) under Section 
14. The Worcester case was brought under Section 14 which is not 
embraced by, or in any way made subject to, the limitations of rates 
for hospital care established by Section 24. 
A case involving a consideration of several interrelated sections of the 
statutes relating to settlements and veterans' benefits was Town ,of 
§19.6. 1336 Mass. 525, 146 N.E.2d 675 (1957). 
2 G.L., c. II 7, §24: "Every town shall be liable for any expense necessarily in-
curred under this chapter ... for the relief of a person in need of public assistance 
therein by any person not liable by law for his support ... In case such relief is 
furnished to a person in a hospital, the .town shall be liable for his support therein 
in a sum not exceeding the maximum amount then allowable to a town under sec-
tion eighteen of chapter one hundred and twenty-two as reimbursement from the 
commonwealth for like support in a hospital." 
S "Boards of public welfare in respective towns shall provide for the immediate 
comfort and relief of all persons residing or found therein, having lawful settle-
ments in other towns ... The expense of such relief ... may be recovered in 
contract against the town liable therefor ... " 
4 292 Mass. 162,197 N.E. 677 (1935). 
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Marshfield v. City of Springfield.5 The plaintiff town sought to re-
cover from the defendant city certain sums expended by it for old age 
assistance under G.L., c. llSA, furnished to the mother of a veteran 
both of whom had legal settlement in Springfield at the time the son 
enlisted in the navy in 1917, thus qualifying both at that time to receive 
veterans' benefits under the provisions of G.L., c. 115. The issue in 
the case was whether anything in the last sentence of G.L., c. 116, §5 
operated to prevent the veteran's mother from losing her Springfield 
settlement. The last sentence of this section provides: 
The settlement existing on August 12, 1916, ... of a veteran 
whose services qualified him to receive veterans' benefits under the 
provisions of Chapter 115, and the settlement of his . . . mother, 
qualified by his service to receive such benefits, shall not be de-
feated, except by failure to reside in the commonwealth for five 
consecutive years or by the acquisition of a new settlement.6 
The veteran's mother had not resided in anyone city or town for 
five consecutive years since 1937, nor did she ever reside outside Massa-
chusetts; thus it was not contended that she had acquired any new 
settlement elsewhere after ceasing to live in Springfield. However, the 
latter part of this section provides: 
Veterans' benefits shall be paid to a veteran or dependent by a 
city or town in which he has a settlement . . . within the com-
monwealth . . . provided, that no benefits shall be paid . . . to 
any other applicant ... unless the veteran of whom [s]he is a de-
pendent has a settlement in the commonwealth or has actually 
resided within the commonwealth continuously for three years 
next preceding the date of such dependent's application for such 
benefits.7 
The son had not resided in Massachusetts since 1937 and had plainly 
lost his settlement in Massachusetts; therefore, at first blush, it would 
appear that the veteran's mother could not receive veterans' benefits 
under this provision. The Court resolved the issue by interpreting, in 
the light of its legislative history, the words of Section 5, "whose service 
qualified him," to mean that the mother of a veteran who, when a 
veteran himself once had a Massachusetts settlement at a time when 
his mother had one also, would be protected from loss of a Massachu-
setts settlement, once acquired, even though she never had occasion to 
apply for veterans' benefits while the veteran himself was residing, or 
had a settlement, in Massachusetts. Since she became "qualified" to 
apply for veterans' benefits, if the necessity should arise, by the military 
service of her son and by her and his then possession of settlement in 
51958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 945, 151 N.E.2d 53. For further discussion of this case, see 
§8.11 supra. 
6 G.L., c. 116, §5. (Emphasis supplied.) 
7 Ibid. 
7
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Massachusetts, her settlement could be lost only by absence from the 
Commonwealth for five years or by her acquisition of a new settlement. 
§19.7. Civil service: Reinstatement. A petition for a writ of man-
damus was brought in Scott v. Manager State Airport, Hanscom Field,l 
in which a watchman classified under civil service contended that his 
service was wrongfully terminated during the six-month probationary 
period. The Supreme Judicial Court pointed out that while previ-
ously an appointee might be discharged without notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing during the probationary period, Section 20D of 
Chapter 31 of the General Laws introduced certain limiting prohibi-
tions, one of which requires written notice in particular detail as a 
condition precedent to the termination of an appointment. The 
statute also provided that there could be no change in duties during 
the probationary period. Since notice in the Scott case was properly 
given, and since the appointing authorities had not changed the duties 
of the position to which the petitioner had been appointed, the ap-
pointment, in view of the unsatisfactory performance of the petitioner, 
could be legally terminated. 
Unlike the Scott case, Martin v. Aldermen of Newton2 held that an 
appointee could be removed without cause and without notice or hear-
ing. In a majority of cases, the relevant general statute concerning the 
removal of public employees is G.L., c. 39, §8A which provides: 
Unless otherwise provided in any general law or in any special law 
relating to a city, any officer or official appointed or elected by the 
city council may be removed by said council for cause after a pub-
lic hearing, written notice of which shall be given said officer or 
official fourteen days, at least, prior to the date thereof . . . 
However, in the Martin case this statute was inapplicable because 
there was another provision in a special law relating to the city of 
Newton which permitted removal of this appointee (comptroller of 
accounts) by vote of a majority of the board of aldermen. This special 
provision was not repealed or modified by the general statute for it was 
the intendment of the general statute to leave such special laws opera-
tive. 
The case of Caulfield v. Fire Commissioner of Brookline3 illustrates 
the necessity of compliance with the statutory provisions for obtaining 
commission approval of reinstatement. The petitioner, who had been 
given a leave of absence because of physical incapacity to perform his 
duties, applied to the respondent fire commissioner for reinstatement, 
which application was refused. Purporting to act under G.L., c. 31, 
§46C 4 the petitioner applied to the civil service commission for rein-
§19.7. 1336 Mass. 372. 145 N.E.2d 706 (1957). 
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 829. 150 N.E.2d 545. 
s 336 Mass. 569.146 N.E.2d 896 (1958). 
4 The section reads in part as follows: "If the separation from service of such 
... employee was due to illness. and the appointing authority fails to make a re-
quest for reinstatement upon demand of such ... employee. the ... employee 
may make a request for a hearing before the director. . .. [T]he director shall 
forthwith hold a hearing. hear all parties concerned and render his decision." 
J 8
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statement. The director of civil service having denied his application, 
he then applied to the commission for a review of the director's action, 
which action the commissioners reversed by authorizing the petitioner's 
reinstatement. The respondent refused to reinstate the petitioner de-
spite this reported ruling, contending it was not in accordance with 
law and of no effect. The Supreme Judicial Court, in resolving the 
matter, cited Moore v. Civil Service Commission5 and quoted G.L., 
c. 31, §2(b), which provides in part that the commission shall 
hear and decide all appeals from any decision . . . of . . . the 
director, upon application of a person aggrieved thereby; pro-
vided, that no decision . . . of the director shall be reversed . . . 
except by three affirmative votes of the commission. 
It was concluded in the Moore case that with respect to an appeal from 
the director by "a person aggrieved," the commission was bound to 
hold a hearing since the statutory words "hear and decide" import a 
quasi-judicial hearing affording to the appointing authority due op-
portunity to be heard. The petitioner, not having established on the 
record that the commission reversed the action of the director after 
hearing, consequently had failed to furnish evidence of a valid approval 
by the commission of the reinstatement of the petitioner. 
§19.8. Municipal employees: Resignations and retirement pay 
base. The plaintiff, in the case of Campbell v. City of Boston,! had 
been appointed chairman of a municipal board and was asked to 
tender his resignation by a succeeding mayor some time prior to the 
expiration of his specific term. At a personal interview with the mayor, 
the plaintiff stated that he "resigned under protest." It is provided by 
G.L., c. 41, §109, that a town officer may resign from his office by filing 
his resignation thereof in the office of the town clerk, which provision 
also applies to cities.2 The resignation here was not made in the man-
ner required by statute; therefore, its legal effect must be tested by the 
rules of the common law.3 According thereto, all that is required is 
that the resignation shall be voluntary and shall be accepted by the 
appointing power; it is not necessary that the resignation be in writing. 
Since the plaintiff's act was voluntary and accepted, it was legally effec-
tive to result in an immediate severance from office. 
The determination of the amount of plaintiff's annual retirement 
pay under G.L., c. 32, §58 4 was the issue in the case of Murphy v. City 
of Boston.5 The plaintiff received $6056 for his services as a master at 
the Brighton High School; he was also appointed annually as teacher-
5333 Mass. 430, 435,131 N.E.2d 179, 182 (1956). 
§19.8. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 989, 151 N.E.2d 68. 
2 See G.L., c. 4, §7, d. 34. 
3 Warner v. Selectmen of Amherst, 326 Mass. 435, 437, 95 N.E.2d 180, 182 (1950). 
4 "A veteran who has been in the service of the commonwealth ... shall ... 
be retired from active service at sixty-five percent of the highest annual rate of com-
pensation ... payable to him while he was holding the grade held by him at 
retirement . . ." 
51958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 845, 150 N.E.2d 542. 
9
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coach and received as compensation therefor the sum of $1800. The 
Court's decision accorded with the contentions of the plaintiff that his 
annual retirement compensation under Section 58 was 65 percent of 
$7856, the compensation payable to him as teacher-coach and teacher-
master and not, as the mayor contended, 65 percent of $6056, the 
compensation payable to him for services as teacher-master only. It is 
the intendment of the statute that the base for computing retirement 
pay be one's total regular pay. The Court was of the opinion that the 
plaintiff at the time of his retirement was performing, for the same 
department of the city, regular teaching and coaching duties, under 
separate appointments, and that his regular pay included pay under 
both types of appointment. The Court cited the case of Smith v. 
Lowell,6 wherein it had stated that the objective of the statute was to 
provide for a retired employee an annual allowance amounting to a 
certain percentage of the regular compensation received by him before 
retirement. Accordingly, the Court in that case felt that when the 
regular work and regular pay of the employee, who regularly worked 
seven days a week, included "overtime" hours and "overtime" amounts 
under a compensation schedule based on a forty-hour week, the total 
regularly paid him was to be deemed his "annual rate of compensation 
because it was payment for his customary and normal work." In the 
light of the Smith case, and the fact that the work of the plaintiff was 
so related, it was decided in the Murphy case that the highest annual 
combined compensation under both types of appointments stands as 
the base for the plaintiff's retirement pay, and that the view that only 
his salary as teacher-master was to be included in the retirement pay 
base was erroneous. 
§19.9_ Death benefits: Construction of words "personal injury." 
General Laws, c. 32, §9 1 provides to a widow of a city employee death 
benefits if the employee's death is the natural and proximate result of 
a personal injury sustained as a result of, and while in the performance 
of his duties. In BarufJaldi v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board 2 
the petitioner's husband suffered from heart disease and was advised to 
avoid "emotional upsets" as his condition was becoming progressively 
more serious. However, as city engineer, in the supervision of the 
construction of a municipal garage, he had many, almost constant, dis-
agreements, heated disputes and bitter arguments with the contractor, 
causing him to become emotionally upset. His final and most bitter 
argument took place on December 31, 1953; the next day he died. The 
petitioner's application for death benefits was denied, and the denial 
6 !1M Mass. 516, 1!16 N.E.2d 186 (1956). 
§19.9. 1 C.L., c. !l2, §9(1) provides: "If the board, upon receipt of proper proof, 
finds that any member [of the contributory retirement system] in service died as 
the natural and proximate result of personal injury sustained or a hazard under-
gone as a result of, and while in the performance of, his duties ... the payments 
and allowances hereinafter referred to . . . shall be granted to his beneficiary . . • 
in the sum or sums, and upon the terms and conditions, specified in this section." 
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 781, 150 N.E.2d 269. 
j 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1958 [2012], Art. 23
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1958/iss1/23
§19.1l STATE AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 213 
was affirmed by the defendant board. The board had found that Mr. 
Baruffaldi's death undoubtedly resulted from the effect of the argu-
ment upon his already diseased heart, and that this argument arose 
out of the construction of a building which Baruffaldi was supervising 
as city engineer; yet they ruled that his death was not the result of a 
personal injury sustained within the provisions of Section 9(1). The 
Supreme Judicial Court felt that there was no basis for concluding 
that what happened to Baruffaldi did not result from the performance 
of his duties, and that this result could be said to be "natural and 
proximate," narrowing the question down to whether the incident 
causing his death was a "personal injury" within the intendment of the 
statute. Clearly, under the predecessor of Section 9(1), the petitioner 
would not be entitled to death benefits since they were payable only in 
cases where "death was the natural and proximate result of an accident 
or of undergoing a hazard peculiar to his employment." The Court 
pointed out that, while under the earlier statute retirement allowances 
were based exclusively upon disability resulting from "accident ... or 
hazard peculiar to his employment," these words were replaced by 
the phrase "personal injury sustained or hazard undergone" as a result 
of and in the performance of duty. The substitution of the words 
"personal injury" for "accident" is significant, and evidenced a legisla-
tive intent to authorize allowances in cases where formerly they were 
not permitted, for it cannot be said that in substituting the words "per-
sonal injury" for "accident," the General Court intended no change in 
the law. It was held in Madden's Case3 that the words "personal 
injury" in the workmen's compensation act were not limited to injuries 
incurred by accident, and that the aggravation of pre-existing heart 
disease by exertion or strain was compensable; therefore, using this 
same construction, Baruffaldi's death resulted from a "personal injury," 
and his widow was entitled to the statutory benefits. 
B. STATE GOVERNMENT 
§19.10. Certain marks on ballots prohibited. The prohibitions of 
Section 80 of G.L., c. 54 were somewhat broadened by inserting in 
place thereof a section that not only proscribes the placing of identify-
ing marks on a ballot but also prohibits any election officer engaged in 
counting ballots (except those actually entering the count of ballots 
cast on tally sheets) from holding any marking device during the count-
ing.I 
§19.11. Redevelopment authorities. Section 26QQ of Chapter 121 
of the General Laws, as amended by Section 1 of Chapter 150 of the 
Acts of 1957, had created in each city and town in the Commonwealth, 
including Boston, a public instrumentality to be known as the "Re-
development Authority." This section was further changed by Chap-
3222 Mass. 487, III N.E. 379 (1916). 
§19.10. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 194. 
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ter 199 of the Acts of 1958, wherein it is provided that a city or town 
may annually appropriate up to certain specified amounts for the pur-
pose of defraying the initial costs and expenses of the redevelopment 
authority in connection with proposed projects, with the amounts per-
mitted to be appropriated made dependent upon the valuation of the 
city or town. 
§19.12. Subdivision Control Law. Section 81L of Chapter 41 of 
the General Laws sets forth certain definitions to be used in the con-
struction of certain words appearing in the Subdivision Control Law. 
This section was amended by Section I of Chapter 206 of the Acts of 
1958 by inserting therein the definition of "preliminary plan," which 
previously had not been defined. 
In addition, Section 81S of Chapter 41 of the General Laws was also 
amended.1 Prior to this amendment, Section 81S provided that any 
person, before submitting his definitive plan for approval, may submit 
to the planning board a preliminary plan showing his proposed sub-
division in a general way. The 1958 amendment requires submission 
of a preliminary plan, not only to the planning board but also to the 
board of health, and that written notice be given to the clerk of the 
city or town, by delivery or by registered mail, that such a plan has 
been submitted. Each board shall tentatively approve or disapprove 
the preliminary plan and, in the case of disapproval, its reasons there-
for must be stated. 
The rules and regulations of Section 81Q of Chapter 41 were also 
amended 2 by providing that when a preliminary plan referred to in 
Section 81S has been submitted to a planning board, and written no-
tice of submission as directed has been given, the preliminary plan and 
the definitive plan evolved therefrom shall be governed by the rules 
and regulations relative to subdivision control in effect at the time of 
the submission of the preliminary plan, provided that the definitive 
plan is duly submitted within seven months from the date on which the 
preliminary plan was submitted. 
The duties of registers of deeds as to plans of land are outlined in 
Section 81X of Chapter 41. These duties were further delineated by 
Chapter 207 of the Acts of 1958 by requiring that a plan, in addition to 
bearing the endorsement of approval of the planning board of the city 
or town, shall also have endorsed thereon, or separately recorded and 
referred to therein, a certificate by the clerk of the city or town that 
no notice of appeal was received during twenty days next after receipt 
and recording of notice from the planning board of the approval of the 
plan. 
§19.13. Taking by eminent domain. Acts of 1958, Chapter 240, 
amended Section 24 of Chapter 82 of the General Laws by striking out 
the first sentence thereof which, prior to the change, provided that 
when it was necessary to acquire land for the purposes of a town way 
or a private way, an order for the taking of the land by eminent do-
§19.12. 1 Acts of 1958. c. 206, §2. 
2 Id. §3. 
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main under Chapter 79 should be adopted, or proceedings for such 
taking under Chapter 80A should be instituted, within thirty days 
after the termination of the town meeting at which the laying out, 
alteration or relocation of the way was accepted by the town. The 
amendment authorizes a third method, namely, that this land may be 
acquired by purchase or otherwise when necessary in laying out, alter-
ing or relocating a way. 
§19.14. Public water supply. New legislation concerning the fluo-
ridation of water1 was enacted during the 1958 SURVEY year. It added 
Section 41B to Chapter 40 of the General Laws. This new section 
prohibits any public water supply for domestic use, in any city, town 
or district supplying such water, which was not being fluoridated prior 
to September I, 1958, from thereafter being fluoridated unless the will 
of the voters of the city, town or district be first ascertained by the 
placing of the following question upon the official ballot to be used at 
the next regular municipal election, or for the election of town offi-
cers at the next annual town meeting: "Shall the public water sup-
ply for domestic use in (this city) (this town) be fluoridated?" A ma-
jority of votes in the affirmative in answer to this question shall be 
deemed to be the will of the voters that the public water supply for 
domestic use be fluoridated. 
§19.15. Hours of duty of permanent members of fire departments. 
Section 58B of Chapter 48 of the General Laws was amended by the 
General Court during the 1958 SURVEY year by enactment of Chapter 
279 of the Acts of 1958, under the terms of which the question of accept-
ing the provisions of law providing for a forty-eight hour week for 
members of fire departments may be submitted to voters in a city or 
town at a municipal election. Prior to the amendment, this question 
could be submitted to voters only at a state election. 
§19.16. Nomination of beneficiaries under Contributory Retire-
ment Law. The only persons eligible for nomination as beneficiaries 
under option (c) of G.L., c. 32, §12(2) were the spouse, child, father, 
mother or the unmarried, widowed or divorced sister of the member of 
the contributory retirement system. Chapter 291 of the Acts of 1958 
made brothers and married sisters of contributors also eligible for 
nomination as beneficiaries under this option. 
§19.17. Financing of certain water system facilities. Several 
changes were enacted by the legislature during the 1958 SURVEY year to 
G.L., c. 44, §8, which enumerates the purposes for which cities and 
towns may borrow outside the debt limit. Clause (4) of Section 8 was 
amended 1 by including among these purposes the original pumping 
station equipment and the acquisition of land or any interest in land 
necessary in connection with the previously mentioned purposes of the 
clause, while clause (5) was amended by excluding pipes from within 
its purview and adding thereto the lining of water mains. 
§19.14. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 254. 
§19.17. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 383. 
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§19.18. State aid for public school construction. Chapter 645 of 
the Acts of 1948, in which financial assistance in the establishment of 
certain public schools is afforded to cities and towns, was the subject of 
several amendments extending the time during which applications for 
state aid for the construction of school buildings may be made. The 
period of time was further extended by Chapter 356 of the Acts of 
1958, which provided that the basic act ceases to be operative on June 
30, 1965. 
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